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Abstract
An archipelago of m islands has to be divided fairly among n agents
with different preferences. What fraction of the total archipelago value
can be guaranteed to each agent? Classic algorithms for fair cake-
cutting can give each agent a share worth at least 1/n of the total
value, but this share might be disconnected (spread over multiple is-
lands). When each agent insists on getting a single connected piece
(contained in a single island), it is shown that 1/(n + m − 1) of the
total value can be guaranteed, and this fraction is tight. When each
agent insists on getting at most k connected pieces, where 1 ≤ k ≤ m,
it is possible to guarantee at least k/(nk + m − k) and impossible to
guarantee more than k/(n+m− 1). The paper presents several cases
in which the upper bound can be attained. Whether it can always be
attained remains a mystery.
Archipelago division has an application to a geometric problem —
fair division of a two-dimensional land estate shaped as a rectilinear
polygon, where each agent must receive a rectangular piece.
1 Introduction
Consider n people who inherit m distant land-estates (“islands”) and want
to divide the property fairly among them. Classic algorithms for fair cake-
cutting (Steinhaus, 1948; Even and Paz, 1984) can be used to divide each
island into n pieces such the value of piece i, according to the personal value-
measure of person i, is at least 1/n of the total island value. However, this
scheme requires each person to manage properties on n distant locations,
which may be quite inconvenient. An alternative scheme is to consider the
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union of all m islands (the “archipelago”) as a single cake, and partition it
into n pieces using the above-mentioned algorithms. However, this too might
give some agents a share that overlaps many distinct islands. For example,
with m = 5 islands and n = 3 agents, a typical partition might look like this:
where Alice’s share contains 4 disconnected pieces and Carl’s share contains
2 disconnected pieces.
Can we find a more convenient division? For example, can we divide
the archipelago fairly such that each agent receives at most 3 disconnected
pieces? In general, what is the smallest number k (as a function of m and n)
such that there always exists a fair division of the archipelago in which each
agent receives at most k disconnected pieces?
This paper studies the following more general question. We are given an
integer parameter k ≥ 1, and it is required to give each agent a share with at
most k disconnected pieces (i.e., the share of each agent may overlap at most
k different islands). What is the largest fraction r(m, k, n) such that each
agent can be guaranteed at least a fraction r(m, k, n) of his total archipelago
value?
An obvious upper bound is r(m, k, n) ≤ 1/n. It becomes an equality
when k ≥ m, since then we can just divide each island separately using
classic cake-cutting algorithms.
The question becomes interesting when k < m.
Section 3 proves an upper bound of r(m, k, n) ≤ k/(n + m− 1). In
particular, when each agent insists on getting a single connected piece, at
most 1/(n + m− 1) of the total value can be guaranteed.
Section 4 shows that, when the islands are arranged arbitrarily on a
line, classic cake-cutting algorithms can be adapted for dividing the line.
With such adaptation it is possible to provide a lower bound (when k ≤ m):
r(m, k, n) ≥ k/(nk + m− k).
When k = 1, this matches the upper bound, so r(m, k = 1, n) = 1/(n +
m − 1). However, for k ≥ 2 there is a substantial gap between the bounds.
This hints that more sophisticated division algorithms may be able to attain
a better value-guarantee. The following sections show that, indeed, the upper
bound can be attained in several cases.
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Section 5 shows that the upper bound is attainable when all agents have
the same ranking on islands. I.e., they agree on which island is the most
valuable, which is the second-most valuable, which is the least valuable, etc.
Section 6 shows that the upper bound is attainable when there are n = 2
agents (with arbitrary valuations), so r(m, k, n = 2) = min ( 1/2, k/(m + 1) ).
Section 7 shows that the upper bound is attainable when k = 2, so
r(m, k = 2, n) = min ( 1/n, 2/(m + n− 1) ).
The proofs in the paper are mostly based on elementary counting argu-
ments and the pigeonhole principle. An exception is the proof in Section
7, which is based on a proof by Luria (2013) regarding the existence of a
non-empty bipartite envy-free matching.
Since there are various cases in which the upper bound is attainable, it
is reasonable to conjecture that this is always possible:
Archipelago Conjecture. For all m ≥ 1, k ≥ 1, n ≥ 1:
r(m, k, n) = min( 1/n , k/(n + m− 1) ).
The smallest case in which this conjecture is open is n = 3 agents with
three different rankings on islands, k = 3 pieces per agent and m = 4 islands:
the lower bound is 3/(9 + 4− 3) = 3/10 and the upper bound is 1/3. Some
additional directions for future work are presented in Section 8.
The above results provide a partial answer to the dual question: if each
agent should be guaranteed at least 1/n of the total value, how many pieces
should each agent get (as a function of m and n)? The upper bound on r
implies a lower bound k ≥ 1+(m−1)/n. It is tight whenever the Archipelago
Conjecture is true.
Appendix A presents an application of archipelago division to the prob-
lem of dividing a two-dimensional land estate shaped as a rectilinear polygon,
when each agent needs to get a rectangular land-plot. If the land-estate has
T reflex vertices (vertices with internal angle 270◦), then it is possible to al-
locate to each agent a rectangle worth at least 1/(n+T ) of the total polygon
value, and impossible to guarantee more.
1.1 Related work
Recently there is a lot of interest in various variants of the fair division prob-
lem. These are too many to list here. A relatively recent survey can be found
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in the Wikipedia pages “Fair division”, “Fair cake-cutting”, “Proportional
cake-cutting”, “Envy-free cake-cutting” and “Fair item assignment”.
Most works on cake-cutting either require to give each agent a single con-
nected piece, or ignore connectivity altogether. The natural intermediate
case, in which each agent should receive at most a fixed number k of dis-
connected pieces, has only recently been studied by Arunachaleswaran and
Gopalakrishnan (2018). They consider a connected cake, i.e, a single island.
They quantify the gain, as a function of k, in the optimal social welfare,
defined as the sum of values of all agents or the minimum value per agent.
Based on their results, they conjecture that this gain grows linearly with
min(n, k). This is in par with our Archipelago Conjecture.
Two subsets of the cake-cutting literature are particularly related to the
present paper.
Some works aim to minimize the number of cuts required to attain various
fairness and efficiency goals (Webb, 1997; Shishido and Zeng, 1999; Barbanel
and Brams, 2004, 2014; Alijani et al., 2017). These works usually assume
that the cake itself is connected. Moreover, their goal is to minimize the
global number of cuts, while the goal in the present paper is to ensure that
every individual agent is not given too many disconnected pieces.
Some works consider the multi-cake division problem (Cloutier et al.,
2010; Lebert et al., 2013; Nyman et al., 2017), where several disjoint cakes
are being divided. In these works, it is assumed that each agent must get
a part of every cake. This is opposite to the present paper, in which each
agent wants to overlap as few cakes (islands) as possible.
2 Preliminaries
There is a set C (”the archipelago”) that contains m ≥ 1 disjoint subsets
(”the islands”). In most of the paper, it is assumed that C is a subset of
the real line and the islands are pairwise-disjoint intervals; in particular,
each island j ∈ {1, . . . ,m} corresponds to the open interval (j − 1, j), and
the archipelago C corresponds to the interval (0,m). This assumption is
made for convenience only — it does not imply that there is any geographic
proximity between e.g. the island (0, 1) and the island (1, 2).
There are n ≥ 1 agents. Each agent has a value-measure Vi on subsets of
C, which is an integral of an integrable value-density function vi: Vi(X) =∫
x∈X vi(x)dx. The notation Vi(x1, x2), where x1, x2 are real numbers, is used
4
as a shorthand for Vi((x1, x2)) = the value of the open interval (x1, x2). Note
that Vi is absolutely continuous with respect to length, so the value of the
closed interval [x1, x2] is the same.
There is a fixed integer constant k ≥ 1, which denotes the maximum
number of disconnected pieces that an agent can use.
For each agent i, define the function Wi on subsets of C, as the value of
the k most-valuable connected pieces contained in that subset. In particular,
Wi(C) is the value of the k most valuable islands in the entire archipelago. If
a subset X ⊆ C is made of at most k connected pieces, then Wi(X) = Vi(X);
otherwise, in general Wi(X) ≤ Vi(X). If agent i is allocated a subset Xi made
of more than k disconnected pieces, he can use only at most k pieces, so the
actual utility he gets from Xi is Wi(Xi).
The function r(m, k, n) is defined as the maximum, over all partitions
(X1, . . . , Xn) of C, of miniWi(Xi)/Vi(C). I.e., it is the highest fraction that
can be guaranteed to all agents under the constraint of giving each agent at
most k disconnected pieces. The goal of this paper is to calculate upper and
lower bounds on r(m, k, n).
An allocation (X1, . . . , Xn) is called envy-free if for every two agents i, j,
Wi(Xi) ≥ Wi(Xj). I.e., each agent feels that the best k intervals in his own
share are at least as good as the best k intervals in any other share.
3 Upper Bound
Before presenting the archipelago division algorithms, it is useful to have an
upper bound on what such algorithms can hope to achieve.
Proposition 3.1. When dividing an archipelago of m islands among n agents
and each agent must get at most k connected pieces, it is impossible to guar-
antee all agents more than:
min
(
1
n
,
k
n + m− 1
)
=
{
k/(n + m− 1) m + n− 1 ≥ nk
1/n m + n− 1 ≤ nk
of their total archipelago value.
Proof. It is obviously impossible to guarantee more than 1/n. It remains to
prove that it is impossible to guarantee more than k/(n + m− 1). Suppose
that all agents have the same value-measure: they value islands 1, . . . ,m− 1
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as 1 and island m as n. So the total archipelago value for each agent i is
Vi(C) = n + m− 1. Now there are two cases:
1. At least one agent gets all his k pieces in k of the islands 1, . . . ,m− 1.
This agent receives a value of at most k.
2. All n agents get at least one of their pieces in island m. At least one
such agent receives a value of at most 1 from that island. This agent
receives a value of at most k−1 from his/her other k−1 pieces; therefore
his/her total value is at most k.
So, at least one agent receives a value of at most k
n+m−1Vi(C).
4 General Lower Bound
This section presents a lower bound that is valid for any m, k and n.
Theorem 4.1. For all m ≥ 1, k ≥ 1, n ≥ 1, it is possible to divide an
archipelago of m islands among n agents, giving each agent at most k con-
nected pieces with a total value of at least:
k
nk + max[k,m]− k =
{
k/(nk + m− k) m ≥ k
1/n m ≤ k
of his total archipelago value.
Two different proofs are given, each of which has an added benefit. The
first proof (subsection 4.1) also provides a polynomial-time algorithm for
finding the allocation; the second one (subsection 4.2) also guarantees envy-
freeness — each agent believes that his share is at least as good as the shares
of all others.
It is an open question whether both benefits can be attained simultane-
ously. Stromquist (2008) proved that, in the classic case in which m = 1 and
k = 1, an envy-free allocation among n ≥ 3 agents cannot be found using
a finite number of queries. Aziz and Mackenzie (2016) proved that, without
any restriction on the number of pieces per agent (i.e, k =∞), an envy-free
allocation can be found using a finite number of queries. The intermediate
cases in which k ∈ [2,∞) are still open.
6
In both proofs, the archipelago is first mapped into the real interval (0,m),
such that each island is mapped into an interval between two consecutive
integers. So one (arbitrary) island is mapped into (0, 1), another island is
mapped into (1, 2), etc., and the last one is mapped into (m− 1,m).
The valuations of all agents are normalized such that for each agent i:
Vi(C) = nk + max[k,m]− k. The goal now is to give each agent a subset of
(0,m) that overlaps at most k different islands (i.e., contains at most k − 1
integer points), and whose total value for the agent is at least k.
The proofs use the following technical lemma.
Lemma 4.2. Suppose a piece Xi overlaps mi islands and has Vi(Xi) ≥
max[k,mi]. Then agent i can take from Xi at most k intervals whose to-
tal value is at least k, i.e.: Wi(Xi) ≥ k.
Proof. If mi ≤ k, then the value of all Xi is at least k, and the agent can
take it all.
If mi > k, then the value of the entire Xi is at least mi, so the average
value per overlapped island is at least 1. By the pigeonhole principle, the k
most valuable intervals in Xi are worth together at least k.
4.1 Proof of theorem 4.1 with a polynomial-time algo-
rithm
The division algorithm presented below is recursive on n. The pre-condition
for each recursion step is that, for each agent i, the archipelago contains
mi ≤ m adjacent islands whose total value for i is at least nk+max[k,mi]−k.
I.e., for each i there exists integers di ≥ 0 and mi ≥ 1 such that:
Vi(di, di + mi) ≥ nk + max[k,mi]− k.
When n = 1, the archipelago contains some mi islands whose total value
for i is at least max[k,mi], so by Lemma 4.2 the agent’s utility from the
entire archipelago is at least k.
When n > 1, we ask each agent i to mark a point xi ∈ C in the following
way. Define the following real function ui : (di, di + mi)→ R:
ui(x) := Vi(di, x)−max[k, ceil(x− di)]
Intuitively, ui(x) is the value of the interval (di, x), minus the number of
islands it overlaps (ceil(x − di)), rounded up to k. This function has the
following properties:
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• For every non-integer x, ui(x) is continuous and weakly-monotonically-
increasing.
• For every integer x, ui(x) is either continuous and weakly-monotonically-
increasing (when x− di < k), or it has a discontinuous jump of size −1
(when x− di ≥ k).
• For x→ (di)+, ui(x)→ 0− k = −k.
• For x→ (di + mi)−, ui(x)→ Vi(di, di + mi)−max[k,mi] ≥ nk − k.
Since ui(x) never jumps upwards, its image must contain all the values in
[−k, nk − k]. An example is illustrated below for di = 0,mi = 11, k = 2, n =
4, and a uniform value-measure:
Each agent i marks a point xi such that ui(xi) = 0. If there is more than
one such point, the agent selects one arbitrarily. The algorithm cuts at the
leftmost mark x∗ := mini xi, gives (0, x∗) to the leftmost cutter, and divides
the remaining archipelago among the remaining n− 1 agents.
The leftmost cutter (say, agent i) receives (0, xi), which contains the
interval (di, xi). By definition of ui, this piece has Vi(di, xi) = max[k, ceil(xi−
di)]. It overlaps ceil(xi − di) islands. Hence, by Lemma 4.2, the agent can
get from this piece at most k sub-intervals with a total value of at least k.
It remains to prove that, for each remaining agent j 6= i, the remaining
archipelago satisfies the precondition for recursion with n − 1 agents. It is
sufficient to prove that:
Vj(xj, dj + mj) ≥ (n− 1) · k + max[k, ceil(dj + mj − xj)]− k (1)
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For each remaining agent j 6= i, xj ≥ xi, so the remaining archipelago
contains the interval (xj, dj + mj). This interval overlaps ceil(dj + mj − xj)
islands, and its value is:
Vj(xj, dj + mj) = Vj(dj, dj + mj)− Vj(dj, xj)
≥ (nk + max[k,mj]− k)−max[k, ceil(xj − dj)] (by definition of xj)
≥ (n− 1) · k + max[k,mj]−max[k, ceil(xj − dj)] (2)
Define mL := ceil(xj − dj) and mR := ceil(dj + mj − xj). By the properties
of the ceiling, mL + mR ≤ mj + 1 (the sum equals mj when xj is integer
and mj + 1 otherwise). By comparing (1) and (2) and substituting the
expressions for mL,mR,mj, it can be seen that it is sufficient to prove the
following inequality:
(n− 1) · k + max[k,mL + mR − 1]−max[k,mL] ≥ (n− 1) · k + max[k,mR]− k
⇐⇒ max[k,mL + mR − 1] ≥ max[k,mL] + max[k,mR]− k
There are several cases depending on the relation between k,mL,mR.
(*) If k ≥ mL+mR−1, then also k ≥ mL, k ≥ mR (since both mL and mR
are at least 1), so both sides equal k. So from now on assume mL+mR−1 > k
and consider the inequality:
mL + mR − 1 ≥ max[k,mL] + max[k,mR]− k
(*) If k ≥ mL, then the right-hand side is max[k,mR] and the left-hand
side is larger than k and at least as large as mR.
(*) If k ≥ mR, then the right-hand side is max[k,mL] and the left-hand
side is larger than k and at least as large as mL.
(*) Otherwise, the right-hand side is mL + mR − k which is at most the
left-hand side since k ≥ 1.
Remark 4.3. The above algorithm requires n recursion steps. Using a halv-
ing technique similar to the algorithm of Even and Paz (1984), it is possible
to reduce this to O(log(n)).
When n is odd, the algorithm proceeds as above. When n is even, each
agent i marks a “half point” xi for which ui(xi) = nk/2− k (recall that the
range of ui contains [−k, nk−k] so such a point exists). If there is more than
one such point, the agent selects one arbitrarily.
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The algorithm then cuts the interval (0,m) at the median of the agents’
half-points, and divides each part recursively among the n/2 agents whose
mark is in that part. So each agent i in the leftmost half shares an archipelago
that contains the interval (di, xi), and each agent j in the rightmost half
shares an archipelago that contains the interval (xj, dj+mj). Similarly to the
above proof, it is possible to prove that (di, xi) contains some mL := ceil(xi−
di) adjacent islands whose total value for i is at least nk/2 + max[k,mL]− k,
and (xj, dj + mj) contains some mR := ceil(mj + dj − xj) adjacent islands
whose total value for j is at least nk/2 + max[k,mR]−k, so the precondition
for recursion is satisfied for all agents.
The number of agents in each subset is halved every at most two recursion
steps, so at most 2 log2 (n) recursion steps are needed.
Remark 4.4. A simpler algorithm for the case k = 1 was published as
Example 4.2 in Segal-Halevi et al. (2017) and Lemma 11 in Segal-Halevi
(2018). 1 The total archipelago value is n + m− 1 and it is required to give
each agent a single connected piece with a value of at least 1. The algorithm
is recursive on m. When m = 1, Vi(C) = n, so classic algorithms can be
used to give each agent a connected piece worth at least 1. Suppose m > 1.
Pick an arbitrary island and call it C ′. Order the agents in a descending
order of Vi(C
′), such that V1(C ′) ≥ · · · ≥ Vn(C ′). Let n′ be the largest index
such that Vn′(C
′) ≥ n′ (analogously to the famous h-index used to evaluate
researchers), or 0 if already V1(C
′) < 1.
If n′ = 0 then just discard C ′. Otherwise use a classic algorithm to divide
C ′ among the winners — the agents 1, . . . , n′. By definition, each winner
values C ′ as at least n′. Hence classic algorithms guarantee each winner a
connected subset of C ′ with value at least 1.
The n−n′ losers value C ′ as less than n′+ 1, so they value the remaining
archipelago C \C ′ as more than (n+m−1)−(n′+1) = (n−n′)+(m−1)−1.
This is an archipelago of m−1 islands, so it can be divided recursively among
the remaining n− n′ agents, giving each agent a connected piece with value
at least 1. Note that this is true even when n′ = 0.
A straightforward way to extend this simple algorithm to k > 1 is to
replace each agent with k “virtual agents” with the same value function,
run the above algorithm, and then assign to each agent the union of the
1The algorithm generalized an idea of Chris Culter in
http://math.stackexchange.com/q/461675 .
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k intervals allocated to his virtual agents. This yields a value-guarantee of
k/(nk + m− 1), which is worse than the one of Theorem 4.1.
4.2 Proof of theorem 4.1 with envy-freeness
Like in subsection 4.1, it is assumed that the islands are mapped in an arbi-
trary order into the m intervals (0, 1), . . . , (m− 1,m).
Consider any partition of the interval (0,m) into n connected parts (in-
tervals) X1, . . . , Xn. In each such partition, it is possible to ask each agent
i which of the n parts he prefers. The agent would answer such a question
using the function Wi, i.e., he would calculate for each part Xj, the value of
the best k sub-intervals in Xj, and select the piece j with the highest Wi(Xj).
This selection satisfies two properties: (1) An agent always weakly prefers
a non-empty piece over an empty piece; (2) The set of partitions in which
an agent prefers the piece with index j, is a closed subset of the space of all
partitions. This is because Wi is a continuous function. Stromquist (1980)
and Su (1999) prove that, whenever the preferences of n agents satisfy these
properties, there exists a connected envy-free partition of (0,m). Let this
partition be (X1, . . . , Xn).
It remains to prove that, in this envy-free partition, each agent can find
in his share at most k connected pieces with a value of at least k, i.e., ∀i :
Wi(Xi) ≥ k. Since the allocation is envy-free, it is sufficient to prove that
for each i there exists a part Xj with Wi(Xj) ≥ k.
For the sake of proof, first discard all the parts Xj for which Vi(Xj) < k.
Suppose n−d such parts are discarded (for some d ∈ {0, . . . , n}). Recall that
the total archipelago value is normalized to nk+max[k,m]−k; therefore the
total value of the remaining d parts is larger than (d− 1)k+ max[k,m]. This
expression is at least 0, so the remaining value is larger than 0, so at least
one part remains, so in fact d ≥ 1.
Suppose w.l.o.g. that the remaining parts are X1, . . . , Xd. Suppose that
each part Xj contains mj sub-intervals. The total number of sub-intervals in
X1, . . . , Xn is at most n + m − 1 (since there are m − 1 integer points and
n−1 cuts made by the algorithm). After removing n−d parts, each of which
contains at least one interval, the total number of sub-intervals is at most
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d + m− 1, so:
d∑
j=1
mj ≤ d + m− 1. (3)
On the other hand, the total value of the remaining parts is:
d∑
j=1
Vi(Xj) > (d− 1) · k + max[k,m] ≥ (d− 1) · 1 + m = d + m− 1 (4)
Comparing (3) and (4) implies that
∑d
j=1 Vi(Xj) ≥
∑d
j=1mj, so for at least
one j ∈ {1, . . . , d}:
Vi(Xj) ≥ mj.
Moreover, since we started by discarding the parts whose value is less than
k, in fact: Vi(Xj) ≥ max[k,mj]. Hence, by Lemma 4.2, Wi(Xj) ≥ k.
Remark 4.5. When k = 1, Theorem 4.1 is optimal — its value-guarantee
is 1/(n + m − 1) which exactly equals the upper bound of Proposition 3.1.
Similarly, when k ≥ m, Theorem 4.1 guarantees 1/n which is clearly optimal.
However, when 1 < k < m, Theorem 4.1 does not match the upper bound.
Intuitively, the reason is that it does not use all the freedom allowed by the
problem — it begins by ordering the islands arbitrarily on a line, and then
gives each agent a contiguous subset of that line; it does not try to re-arrange
the islands based on their values. The following example shows that, with
such an approach, it is indeed impossible to guarantee a larger value than
Theorem 4.1.
Suppose all agents have the same value-measure: they value the m − 1
leftmost islands (0, 1), . . . , (m − 2,m − 1) as 1, and the rightmost island
(m− 1,m) as nk − k + 1, so the total archipelago value is nk +m− k. Now
there are three cases:
1. At least one agent gets all his k pieces in k of the islands 1, . . . ,m− 1.
This agent receives a value of at most k.
2. All n agents get a piece in island m, and the leftmost agent (who gets
the leftmost interval of (0,m)) gets a value of at most 1 from island m.
This leftmost agent can get at most k − 1 other islands, so his total
value is at most k.
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3. All n agents get a piece is island m, and the leftmost agent gets a value
of more than 1 from island m. Then, the remaining value in island m
is less than nk − k = (n − 1)k. Therefore, at least one of the n − 1
remaining agents gets a value of less than k.
To overcome this impossibility, it is required to re-order the islands based on
their value. The following sections present three different way to do this, in
three different situations.
5 Identical Island Ranking
This section shows that it is possible to get a value-guarantee that matches
the upper bound of Proposition 3.1 whenever all agents agree on the island
ranking. I.e., it is possible to map the m islands to (0, 1), (1, 2), . . . , (m −
1,m), such that for every agent i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, Vi(0, 1) ≤ Vi(1, 2) ≤ · · ·Vi(m−
1,m).
Theorem 5.1. It is possible to divide an archipelago of m islands among n
agents that rank the islands in the same order, giving each agent at most k
connected pieces with a total value of at least:
min
(
1
n
,
k
m + n− 1
)
=
{
1/n when m < nk − n + 1
k/(m + n− 1) when m ≥ nk − n + 1
of his total archipelago value.
Proof. It is sufficient to prove the theorem for m ≥ nk−n+1, since otherwise
we can add dummy zero-value islands so that the total island count becomes
nk − n + 1; the value guarantee remains k/kn = 1/n.
Normalize the value-measures such that for every agent i, Vi(C) = m +
n− 1. The goal is now to give each agent i a subset Xi ⊂ C that overlaps at
most k islands and has Vi(Xi) ≥ k.
The algorithm is recursive on n. When n = 1, the archipelago contains
m ≥ k islands and its total value is m, so the value of the k most-valuable
islands is at least k.
For n > 1 the algorithm proceeds as follows.
• Map the islands into (0,m) from worst to best, such that the least-
valuable island is mapped to (0, 1) and the most-valuable island is
mapped to (m− 1,m).
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• Ask each agent i to specify an integer li ∈ {0, . . . ,m−k} and a number
xi ∈ [k − 1, k) such that Vi(li, li + xi) = k. In words, agent i claims
k−1 whole islands, and a part (possibly empty) of a k-th island, whose
total value for him is exactly k. It will be shown below how each agent
can find these numbers.
• Pick a “winner” — an agent i with a smallest li. If two or more agents
have the same smallest li, pick an agent with a smallest xi. If two or
more agents have the same smallest li and xi, pick one arbitrarily.
• Give the winner his claimed piece. The winner now has at most k
connected intervals with a total value of exactly k, so he can go home
happily.
• The remaining archipelago has m− k + 1 islands; divide it recursively
among the n−1 remaining agents. It will be shown below that, for each
agent who follows the algorithm below for choosing li and xi, the value
of the piece given to the winner is at most k. Hence the value of the
remaining archipelago is at least (m+n−1)−k = (m−k+1)+(n−1)−1,
so the precondition for recursion is satisfied.
It remains to specify how each agent i selects li and xi. The selection of li
should satisfy the following properties:
1. Vi(li, li + k − 1) ≤ k;
2. Vi(li, li + k) > k.
Once li is found, it is easy to find an xi ∈ [k−1, k) such that V (li, li+xi) = k.
Define a function Ui, which assigns to each X ⊆ C the value of X minus
the number of islands overlapping X. So Ui(C) = Vi(C) − m = (m + n −
1)−m = n− 1.
Using this notation, the goal of agent i is to find li with the following
properties:
1. Ui(li, li + k − 1) ≤ 1;
2. Ui(li, li + k) > 0.
It is easy to satisfy each property on its own:
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1. Property 1 is satisfied by li = 0. Proof: the interval (0, k− 1) contains
the least-valuable k − 1 islands. By assumption, C contains at least
nk − n + 1 islands. So by the pigeonhole principle, Ui(0, k − 1) ≤
k−1
nk−n+1Ui(C) <
k−1
n(k−1)(n− 1) = 1n(n− 1) < 1.
2. Property 2 is satisfied by li = m − k. Proof: the interval (m − k,m)
contains the most-valuable k islands. By the pigeonhole principle,
Ui(m− k,m) ≥ kmUi(C) = km(n− 1) > 0.
To find an li that satisfies both properties, initialize li := 0, so it satisfies
property 1.
If li satisfies property 2 too, then we are done.
Otherwise, we have Ui(li, li+k) ≤ 0. Set l′i := li+1. Now, Ui(l′i, l′i+k−1) =
Ui(li + 1, li + k) ≤ Ui(li, li + k) + 1 ≤ 0 + 1 = 1, so l′i satisfies property 1 too.
Set li := l
′
i and continue.
Since m−k satisfies property 2, there exists a smallest integer li ≤ m−k
that satisfies property 2. By the above argument, this smallest li satisfies
property 1 too. So agent i can report li and xi as required.
It remains to show that the piece given to agent i is worth at most k for
the n− 1 agents j 6= i. Since li is minimal, there are two cases:
• If lj = li, then the piece (li, li + xi) is contained in the piece (lj, lj + xj)
since the winner is selected such that xi ≤ xj. Therefore Vj(li, li+xi) ≤
Vj(lj, lj + xj) = k.
• If lj > li, then, assuming agent j followed the above strategy for picking
lj, he has Uj(li, li+k) ≤ 0. Therefore, Vj(li, li+k) ≤ k, so Vj(li, li+xi) ≤
k too.
Theorem 5.1 can be slightly strengthened: it works even when only n− 1
agents have the same islands ranking.
Theorem 5.2. Given an archipelago of m islands, and n agents of whom at
least n−1 rank the islands in the same order, it is possible to give each agent
at most k connected pieces with a total value of at least:
min
(
1
n
,
k
m + n− 1
)
=
{
1/n when m < nk − n + 1
k/(m + n− 1) when m ≥ nk − n + 1
of his total archipelago value.
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Proof. Suppose that agents 1, . . . , n − 1 have the same ranking. Apply the
algorithm of Theorem 5.1 with these n− 1 agents. Let i ∈ {1, . . . , n− 1} be
the winning agent and (li, xi) the winning bid. Ask agent n to evaluate the
piece (li, li + xi):
• If Vn(li, li + xi) ≤ k, then give this piece to agent i;
• Otherwise, give this piece to agent n.
In both cases, by the same arguments of Theorem 5.1, the remaining archipelago
contains m− k + 1 islands and its value for all remaining n− 1 agents is at
least (m− k + 1)− (n− 1)− 1, so the precondition for recursion holds.
6 Two Agents
This section proves that it is possible to attain the upper bound of Proposi-
tion 3.1 when there are n = 2 agents. While this result is implied by Theorem
5.2, the proof below has an added benefit — it also guarantees envy-freeness.
Theorem 6.1. It is possible to divide an archipelago of m islands between 2
agents, giving each agent at most k connected pieces with a total value of at
least:
min
(
1
2
,
k
m + 1
)
=
{
1/2 when m < 2k − 1
k/(m + 1) when m ≥ 2k − 1
of his total archipelago value. Moreover, the allocation is envy-free and can
be found by an efficient algorithm.
Proof. It is sufficient to prove the theorem for m ≥ 2k−1, since if m < 2k−1,
we can add 2k− 1−m dummy islands whose value for both agents is 0, and
get the same value guarantee of k/(2k − 1 + 1) = 1/2.
One of the agents, say Alice, evaluates all m islands, orders them in
increasing order of their value, and arranges them on the interval (0,m) in
the following way. The first (least-valuable) island is mapped to the leftmost
subinterval (0, 1). The second island is mapped to the rightmost subinterval
(m − 1,m). The third is mapped to (1, 2), the fourth is mapped to (m −
2,m− 1), and so on. So, the less valuable islands are mapped to the left and
right ends of (0,m) alternately, while the more valuable islands are mapped
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to the center of (0,m). Note that this ordering is different than the one used
in Theorem 5.1.
Alice cuts the interval (0,m) into two pieces that are equivalent in her
eyes, i.e., the best k intervals in the leftmost half have the same value for
her as the best k intervals in the rightmost half. Formally, Alice picks some
xA ∈ (0,m) such that WA(0, xA) = WA(xA,m). There exists such xA by the
intermediate value theorem, since WA(0, x) is a continuous function of x that
increases from 0 towards WA(C), and WA(x,m) is a continuous function of
x that decreases from WA(C) towards 0.
Bob now chooses the half that he prefers (the half with the larger WB)
and takes his best k intervals from it, and Alice takes her best k intervals
from the remaining half. This obviously yields an envy-free allocation. It
remains to prove the value guarantee.
We first prove an auxiliary claim: we prove that Alice can always make
her cut in [k − 1,m − k + 1], i.e., she never has to cut inside one of the
k − 1 leftmost islands or inside one of the k − 1 rightmost islands. Proof of
auxiliary claim. 2 Consider first the leftmost islands — those mapped to
(0, k−1). For each such island, the next island in Alice’s ordering is mapped
to (m − k + 1,m). Therefore, VA(0, k − 1) ≤ VA(m − k + 1,m). Since both
these intervals overlap less than k islands, WA(0, k− 1) ≤ WA(m− k+ 1,m)
too. The assumption m ≥ 2k − 1 implies k − 1 < k ≤ m − k + 1, so
WA(0, k − 1) ≤ WA(k − 1,m). Hence Alice has a halving-point to the right
of k − 1: xA ≥ k − 1. A similar consideration applies to the rightmost
islands — those mapped to (m − k + 1,m). For each such island, the next
island in Alice’s ordering is mapped to (1, k). Therefore, VA(m−k+ 1,m) ≤
VA(1, k) ≤ VA(0, k). Since both these intervals overlap at most k islands,
WA(m− k+ 1,m) ≤ WA(0, k) too. The assumption m ≥ 2k− 1 implies that
m− k + 1 ≥ k, so WA(m− k + 1,m) ≤ WA(0,m− k + 1). Hence Alice has a
halving-point to the left of m− k + 1: xA ≤ m− k + 1. This completes the
proof of the auxiliary claim.
The auxiliary claim shows that we can actually require Alice to make her
cut in [k−1,m−k+1], so that each half contains at least k−1 whole islands.
Moreover, if Alice’s cut is in (k−1,m−k+1), then each half contains at least
k sub-intervals. In the edge cases in which xA = k − 1 or xA = m − k + 1,
we add to one of the halves, a dummy interval whose value is 0, so that in
2 The proof is based on ideas by lulu and Gregory Nisbet in
https://math.stackexchange.com/q/3045731/29780 .
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all cases, each half contains at least k sub-intervals.
Normalize the valuations such that the total archipelago value for each
agent is m+ 1. Denote the two halves by XL, XR. Suppose that XL contains
some mL ≥ k intervals and XR contains some mR ≥ k intervals. The total
number of intervals in both halves is mL+mR ≤ m+1 (this is true whether or
not we have added a dummy interval). Since mL+mR ≤ Vi(XL)+Vi(XR), for
each agent i, there exists some index j ∈ {L,R} such that mj ≤ Vi(Xj). Since
mj ≤ k, we have Vi(Xj) ≥ max[k,mj]. Hence, by Lemma 4.2, Wi(Xj) ≥ k.
Since the division is envy-free, each agent’s final utility is at least k.
Remark 6.2. One could think of other ways to obtain an envy-free division
of an archipelago. For example, the islands can be treated as indivisible
goods. Then, the envy-cycles algorithm of Lipton et al. (2004) can be used
to find a so-called EF1 allocation of the islands — an allocation that is envy-
free up to at most a single island. Note that this algorithm works even for
non-additive valuations so it can be used with the Wi functions. Once the
envy is limited to a single island, this island can be divided such that envy
is completely eliminated.
The problem with this scheme is that it does not guarantee each agent at
least k/(m + 1) of the total archipelago value. In general, when valuations
are not additive, envy-freeness does not necessarily guarantee a high value to
all agents. The challenge is to simultaneously guarantee both envy-freeness
and a high value per agent.
7 Two Pieces Per Agent
This section shows that the upper bound can be attained whenever k = 2.
The proof will use the concept of bipartite envy-free matching (Luria,
2013).
Definition 7.1. Let G = (X + Y,E) be a bipartite graph. A bipartite envy-
free matching (BEFM) in G is a matching between a subset XM ⊆ X and a
subset YM ⊆ Y such that no unmatched vertex in X is adjacent to a matched
vertex in Y , i.e.:
∀x ∈ X \XM : ∀y ∈ YM : (x, y) /∈ E.
An unmatched x does not “envy” any matched x′, because it does not
“like” any matched y′ anyway. Any perfect matching is envy-free, and the
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empty matching is envy-free too. The following theorem provides a sufficient
condition for the existence of a non-empty BEFM (here NE(X) is the set of
neighbors of X):
BEFM theorem. Let G = (X + Y,E) be a bipartite graph. If |NE(X)| ≥
|X|, then G has a non-empty bipartite-envy-free matching.
Note that this condition is strictly weaker than Hall’s condition for the
existence of a perfect matching, which requires |NE(X ′)| ≥ |X ′| to hold for
all subsets X ′ ⊆ X. The BEFM theorem was proved by Luria (2013). The
proof can be converted to a polynomial-time algorithm that finds a BEFM
when the sufficient condition holds; see Segal-Halevi (2019).
Theorem 7.2. It is possible to divide an archipelago of m islands among n
agents, giving each agent at most k = 2 connected pieces with a total value
of at least:
min
(
1
n
,
2
m + n− 1
)
=
{
1/n when m < n + 1
2/(m + n− 1) when m ≥ n + 1
of his total archipelago value.
Proof. If m < n + 1, add dummy islands to make m = n + 1; the value-
guarantee remains the same (1/n). Normalize the archipelago value to m +
n − 1. The goal now is to give each agent a piece overlapping at most 2
islands with a value of at least 2. The algorithm is recursive on n.
If n = 1, then the single agent values the archipelago as m and m ≥ 2,
so the agent values the two most valuable islands as at least 2.
Suppose n > 1. Define an island as barren if all n agents value it as at
most 2. The algorithm proceeds according to the number of barren islands.
Case #1. All m islands are barren. Map the islands into (0,m) as
in Theorem 5.1, according to the ranking of one of the agents arbitrarily
(say, Alice). Ask Alice to find an integer lA ∈ {0, . . . ,m − 1} for which
VA(lA, lA + 1) ≤ 2 while VA(lA, lA + 2) > 2; she can find such lA in exactly
the same way as in the proof of Theorem 5.1.
Since all islands are barren, for every agent i, Vi(lA, lA + 1) ≤ 2. So
for every agent i for whom Vi(lA, lA + 2) > 2, there exists some xi ∈ [1, 2)
such that Vi(lA, lA + xi) = 2. There exists at least one such agent (Alice).
For every agent j for whom Vj(lA, lA + 2) ≤ 2, define xj = ∞. Choose an
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agent with a smallest xi (breaking ties arbitrarily) and give him/her the piece
(lA, lA + xi). This piece overlaps two islands and its value for i is 2, so i can
go home happily. The remaining archipelago contains m − 1 islands. The
remaining n− 1 agents value the piece given to i as at most 2, so they value
the remaining islands as at least (m+ n− 1)− 2 = (m− 1) + (n− 1)− 2, so
they can divide it recursively among them.
Case #2. There are between 1 and m − 1 barren islands. Pick one
barren island and map it to (0, 1). Pick one non-barren island and map it
to (1, 2). By definition, for every agent i, Vi(0, 1) ≤ 2. So for every agent i
for whom Vi(0, 2) > 2, there exists some xi ∈ [1, 2) such that Vi(0, xi) = 2.
Since (1, 2) is not barren, there exists at least one such i. For every agent
j for whom Vj(0, 2) ≤ 2, define xj = ∞. Similarly to Case #1, choose an
agent i with a smallest xi and give him/her the piece (0, xi). Agent i goes
home happily, and the remaining n−1 agents can divide the remaining m−1
islands recursively among them.
Case #3. No island is barren, i.e, each island is valued as more than 2
by at least one agent. Consider the bipartite graph in which the agents are
on one side, the islands are on the other side, and there is an edge from agent
i to island j iff agent i values island j as more than 2. Since no island is
barren, the number of neighbors of all n agents is m. Since m ≥ n, the BEFM
theorem implies that the graph has a bipartite envy-free matching of islands
to agents. Give each matched agent his matched island, and recurse with
the remaining agents. Let l ≥ 1 be the size of the matching. The remaining
archipelago contains m− l islands. There are n− l remaining agents. By the
envy-freeness of the matching, each remaining agent is not connected to any
matched island. So each remaining agent values the allocated islands at most
2l, and the remaining archipelago at least (m+n−1)−2l = (m−l)+(n−l)−1.
So the precondition for recursion is met.
8 Future Work
In light of the various cases in which the upper bound of Proposition 3.1 can
be attained, it is reasonable to conjecture that it can always be attained:
Archipelago Conjecture. It is possible to divide an archipelago of m is-
lands among n agents, giving each agent at most k pieces with a total value
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of at least:
min
(
1
n
,
k
m + n− 1
)
=
{
1/n when m < nk − n + 1
k/(m + n− 1) when m ≥ nk − n + 1
of the total archipelago value.
The conjecture is proved whenever k ≥ m or k ≤ 2 or n ≤ 2 or when at
least n−1 agents rank the islands in the same order. Thus, the smallest case
in which the conjecture is open is n = 3 agents with three different rankings
on islands, k = 3 pieces per agent and m = 4 islands: the lower bound is
3/(9 + 4− 3) = 3/10 and the upper bound is 1/3.
Another question for the future is what happens if different agents have
different preferences for the number of pieces: some agents insist on getting
a small number of pieces even if that entails a smaller value-guarantee, while
others insist on getting a large value even if it requires many pieces. Is
it possible to give a personalized guarantee to each agent? For example,
suppose n = 2 and each agent i ∈ {1, 2} wants at most ki pieces, is it
possible to guarantee to agent i a value of at least ki/(m + 1)?
Finally, it may be interesting to replace the hard constraint of at most
k pieces per agent, with a soft model where the number of pieces decreases
the value by some known amount. For example, suppose that managing
pieces on k different islands incurs an expense of E(k). Then the value of
agent i from an allotment Xi overlapping ki islands is Vi(Xi)−E(ki). Given
some reasonable assumptions on the function E, what value-guarantees are
possible?
Acknowledgments
I am grateful to Chris Culter, Zur Luria, Yuval Filmus, Gregory Nisbet and
lulu for their helpful ideas.
The research was partly funded by the Doctoral Fellowships of Excellence
Program at Bar-Ilan University, the Mordecai and Monique Katz Graduate
Fellowship Program, and the Israel Science Fund grant 1083/13.
21
A Application: Dividing a Rectilinear Poly-
gon
The archipelago division algorithm can be used to fairly divide a two-dimensional
land-estate shaped like a rectilinear polygon — a polygon whose angles are
90◦ or 270◦.
Rectilinearity is a common assumption in polygon partition problems
(Keil, 2000). The “complexity” of a rectilinear polygon is characterized by
the number of its reflex vertices — vertices with a 270◦ angle. We denote
this number by T . A rectangle — the simplest rectilinear polygon — has
T = 0. The polygon below has T = 4 reflex vertices (circled):
A natural requirement in land division settings is to give each agent a
rectangular piece. This requirement can be satisfied using an archipelago
division algorithm.
Theorem A.1. It is possible to divide a rectilinear polygon with T reflex
vertices among n agents giving each agent a rectangle with value at least
1/(n + T ) of his total polygon value.
Proof. Keil (2000); Eppstein (2010) present efficient algorithms for partition-
ing a rectilinear polygon into a minimal number of rectangles. A rectilinear
polygon with T reflex vertices can be partitioned in time O(poly(T )) into
at most T + 1 rectangles (this number is tight when the vertices of C are
in general position). Using such algorithms, partition C into at most T + 1
rectangular “islands” and then apply the theorems for archipelago division
with m = T + 1. By setting k = 1 in Theorem 4.1, each agent i gets a single
rectangle worth at least Vi(C)/(n + T ).
If each agent is willing to receive up to k rectangles, then the value-
guarantee increases accordingly. In particular, if the Archipelago Conjecture
is true, then the guarantee improves to min (1/n, k/(n + T )).
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Theorem A.1 is tight in the following sense:
Proposition A.2. for every integer T ≥ 0, there exists a rectilinear polygon
with T reflex vertices, in which it is impossible to guarantee every agent a
rectangle with a value of more than 1/(n + T ) the total polygon value.
Proof. Consider a staircase-shaped polygon with T + 1 stairs (illustrated for
T = 4):
All agents have the same value-measure, which is concentrated in the diamond-
shapes: the top diamond is worth n and each of the other diamonds is worth
1. So for all agents, the total polygon value is n + T .
Any rectangle in C can touch at most a single diamond. There are two
cases:
• At least one agent touches one of the T bottom diamonds. Then, the
value of that agent is at most 1.
• All n agents touch the top diamond. Then, their total value is n and
at least one of them must receive a value of at most 1.
So, either some or all of the agents receive a value of at most Vi(C)/(n +
T ).
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